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Reaching Disclosure

by Carl E. Schneider

I

t is easy to forget but crucial to remember that when lawmakers decide to regulate an activity, they must
select a method. The law of bioethics
particularly favors one method-requiring disclosure of information. The doctrine of informed consent obliges doctors to tell patients their treatment
choices. The administrative law of research ethics insists that researchers warn
subjects of the risks of experiments. The
Patient Self-Determination Act compels
medical institutions to remind patients
about advance directives. The federal
government's new privacy regulations
instrUct medical institutions to describe
their privacy regime to patients.
Not just the law of bioethics, but
health law in general, repeatedly recruits
disclosure requirements. For example,
they are central to the recurring proposals for patients' bills of rights. Likewise,
"virtually every bill ... to regulate managed care devotes major portions to. information disclosure and dissemination."1 Proposals for "consumer-directed
health care" tantalize us with the dream
that well-informed patients can make
markets for health care work effectively.
If disclosure requirements are popular, surely they are effective? Don't people making decisions need information,
want it, and use it? Doesn't an irresistible
array of arguments justify disclosure
rules? The moral rationale for disclosure
is that it liberates people from the servitude to others that ignorance creates.
The prophylaxis rationale assumes that
people can be deterred from abusing
each other by requiring predators to
warn the prey. The market rationale
12

holds that the production and allocation
of goods are best regulated through markets and that markets work best when
purchasers know most. The welfare rationale suggests that one way to enhance
people's well-being is to give them the
information they need to protect themselves.
Perversely, there is good reason to
doubt that disclosure requirements in
health law work as intended. One W-ty
to assess disclosure rules in health law is
to ask wheilier. they succeedjn the many
other area,s oflaw that reqUire them. Are
people buying worthless stocks? Securities laws say, "Disclose!" Are people borrowing money at uso/ious rates? Consumer protection laWs say, "Disclose!"
Are people injured by things they buy?
Products liability law says, "Disclose!"
Are police bullying criminal suspects
into waiving their rights? Miranda says,
"Disclose!"
Roughly speaking, the goal of disclosure requirements is to improve the decisions recipients make. The baseline for
evaluation, then, is the quality of the decisions people would make were there
no disclosure laws. Crudely defined,
success means improving decisions
'enough to justify the costs of the disclosure requirement to the government, the
disclosers, and the recipients.
If disclosure requirements prosper
anywhere, it should be in securities markets, since they are dominated by institutions that have incentives and resources to exploit disclosed information.
But even there, scholars cannot agree
that companies would disclose less were
there no securities laws (since companies

have economic reasons to disclose information to investors) or that the disclosures that are made improve investors'
decisions.
Nor is it clear that other disclosure
regimes justify their costs. Take Miranda
warnings. They '"have little or no effect
on a suspect's propensity to talk ... Next
to the warning label on cigarette packs,
Miranda is the most widely ignored
piece of official advice in our
society.' ... Not only has Miranda largely failed to achieve its stated and implicit goals, but police have transformed Miranda into a tool of law enforcement." 2
And while the evidence of failure is
hardly uniform, "the efforts of researchers to prove by scientific means
that on-product warnings are indeed effective to modify safety-related behavior
in actual or simulated real-world applications have generally yielded disappointing results. "3
Why don't disclosure requirements
work better? Principally, disclosure succeeds only if many often-onerous conditions are all met. Let us briskly review
eight of them.
First, information must actually be
provided. However, disclosers may have
reasons to withhold it; disclosures cost
money and can compromise disclosers'
interest. Disclosers can respond by following the letter of the law but not the
spirit, by obscuring and even suppressing information, by presenting information misleadingly, and by dressing disclosures prettily. And disclosure requirements are hard to enforce: they usually
affect so many transactions that the law
cannot supervise them well, and people
from whom information is withheld
rarely are injured enough to make suits
economically sensible.
Second, the information disclosed
must be the right information-relevant, accurate, and complete. However,
even a willing discloser will often not
know what to disclose. Some safety
warnings apparently make people less
cautious, not more. Some information
that seems sufficient isn't: Americans
now overestimate the dangers of smoking, but they still start smoking because
they underestimate the difficulty of
stopping. Yet you can't tell people every-
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thing, because that drowns them in
more information than they can cope
with.
Third, the audience must receive the
information. Often, however, the information is and even must be inconspicuous. Further, if found, it may not be
read: 40 to 44 million Americans, or approximately one quarter of the U.S.
population, are functionally illiterate,
another 50 million have marginal literacy skills, and many of the rest have trouble comprehending even modestly complex verbal and numerical data.
Fourth, recipients must anend to the
information they perceive. But recipients commonly fail to recognize the relevance and significance of information
or think they already know all they need
to, and so they are easily convinced that
the effort of heeding information will
not be repaid. For example, one "of the
most consistent findings in the literature
[on warnings] ... is that a consumer's responsiveness to warnings is strongly affected by perceived hazardousness."
Those perceptions are influenced by
many things, including the product's
appearance, whether consumers suppose
they can control the product's dangers,
whether consumers can imagine ways
injuries might occur, the product's familiarity, and consumers' education and
intelligence. Sadly, "most of these factors
are difficult to influence."4
Fifth, people must understand the
information. This requires the kind of
analytic effort most of us wisely resist.
fu Whitehead said, "It is a profoundly
erroneous truism, repeated by copybooks and by eminent people when
they are making speeches, that we
should cultivate the habit of thinking
about what we are doing .... Civilization advances by extending the number
of important operations which we can
perform without thinking about them.
Operations of thought are like cavalry
charges in a battle-they are strictly
limited in number, they require fresh
horses, and must only be made at decisive moments."5 But even when cavalry
charges are necessary we don't always
bring out the fresh horses.
Sixth, recipients must believe what
they are told. But people are skeptical.
January-February 2005

They scout information that does not fit
their view of the world. Furthermore,
recipients often have reasons (good and
bad) to fear that disclosers are shaping
information to serve their own interests
and not the recipients'. Such attitudes
make recipients all too prone to spurn
even reliable information.
Seventh, people must decide to use
the information. But people regularly
resist incorporating new information
into decisions, if only because that demands still more work. They must
therefore be convinced that the information will be worth that effort. Sometimes it isn't, but how can they know
until they have tried?
Eighth, recipients must use the information intelligently. The woeful infrequency of this even where you would
expect it most often is suggested by the
need for books with titles like Why

Smart People Make Big Money Mistakes
and How to Correct Them. Even experienced investors overvalue their own
judgment, are sooner swayed by vivid
than by dry data, routinely imagine that
new evidence . confirms their earlier
opinions, and suffer from the swarm of
systematic faults in reasoning that affiict
us all. And so, "during the Internet frenzy, firms that announced that they were
changing their name to include
'dot.com' experienced abnormal returns,
regardless of whether the announcement coincided with a change in business plan." 6 In short, people's decisions
do not always change, much less improve, with more informacion.
Why do lawmakers so often choose
disclosure requirements when evidence
for their success is at best elusive and at
worst damning? In part, the structure of
lawmaking rarely encourages assessments of disclosure rules. Those rules
are generally inspired by indignation inflamed by anecdote. The effectiveness of
disclosure seems axiomatic, and there is
no easy way to test its effectiveness in
advance. And law is made by just the
people-the well-educated and well-situated-best able to take advantage of
disclosures.
Furthermore, disclosure may be the
only kind of regulation available to the
lawmaking agency. For example, courts

can create a cause of action against doctors who do not disclose informacion to
patients, but courts cannot establish an
administrative apparatus to supervise
disclosure. And not least, disclosure requirements cost lawmakers little, since
they shift the costs of regulation to the
entities being regulated. The Patient
Self-Determination Act added pennies
to the federal budget, but it cost hospitals over $100,000,000 just to set up
compliance programs. Finally, once disclosure rules have been implemented,
courts have no resources for--or interest
in-reviewing their effectiveness, and
Congress moves on to other issues.
This has been an essay about the
law's choice of means. One of its morals
is that the law too often chooses means
badly because it substitutes supposition
for evidence. Yet the choice matters.
When the law selects ineffective means,
problems remain unsolved. Foolish
means can make problems worse and
engender new ones. And even bootless
means divert resources from worthier
uses. Perhaps legislation is like cavalry
charges in a battle . . . ?
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